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The “Salvation” in the Truth 
in Giovanni Gentile and Emanuele Severino
The theme that connects Giovanni Gentile and Emanuele Severino is the
knowledge/participation in the Truth, which, in its characterization as absolute, can be the
only way to salvation as a true liberation. Thus at the beginning of the twentieth century,
Gentile presents the eternity of the transcendental ego in the dialectic of becoming, which
is a constant evolution. In this way he assures in ethics always constituting the non-
ephemeral meaning of life and salvation in history. In the second half of the twentieth
century Severino, after having identified in the actualism the definitive outcome of the
philosophy of becoming, reaffirms the eternity of what is, not being existing but an
appearance of an eternal. And yet – and it is the hypothesis of the contribution – the two
"messages" of salvation, even in their distance, speak a language that is complemented each
other. And they speak it for their being a "recovery" of the eternal or rather the "revelation"
of the same.
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Second Part - THEORETICAL STUDIES 
1. Introduction
If one were to focus on some of the characteristics of our age, the first
thing to come to their mind would probably be the extraordinary speed
of communication, be it voice or image through. The impression might
be that of an age in which people live sub specie instantis and therefore
believe the ephemeral to be the actual truth. These things go indeed
mostly this way. Our reality is attached to the contingent and to the
fluidity of social media, completely devoted to the lure of technology and
to the charm of appearance, whereas public institutions crumble like
never before (from family to state) and domestic violence is on the rise.
A society with no values nor order, where the line between freedom and
libertinism blurs and responsibility is disregarded. Thus are hedonism
and relativism outstandingly prosperous. At the same time theoretical
and historical disciplines lose their ability to provide a thorough
perspective on life and end up being a sterile philological investigation.
From many points of view, Severino’s philosophy, ever since the
publication of The original structure (1958), has been trying to show the
untruth of all deciduous things. It has also established itself as a criticism
of every philosophical theory of becoming, for the becoming, as it
constantly changing and therefore denies itself, is nothing. 
As Severino (1981) explains in the Introduction to the new edition,
this structure envelops every specific and particular element of our
history, thus being always present; nevertheless, its actual meaning
must be understood at a deeper level […] This level can be
reached only by avoiding a journey in the company of the various
historical reconstructions proposed by our culture; better yet, by
completely avoiding the ‘journey’ (p. 14).
Again, Severino (1999), states that becoming is 
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the unity of many determinations […]. This unity appears to be
contradictory when it is isolated from the contradictions existing
between some of those determinations and happens to be the
unity of the determinations which are not plainly to be seen as
contradictory (p. 423). 
The idea of becoming is therefore, according to Severino, self-
contradictory. In this respect, Severino’s thoughts constitute a significant
response to the restless flows of our era.
Now, in order to clarify the meaning of Severino’s criticism of
becoming, it must be kept in mind that philosophy was born great,
since it is born, with the Greeks, as an inquiry concerning foundation,
which is to say truth. There is no philosophy without the pursuit of
truth, of truth as the Absolute. The fact is that Severino – suffice to
think about his “contentious” Returning to Parmenides (1964, that is
now in The Essence of Nihilism, 2016, pp. 35-83) – asserts that truth is
what already is, thus setting out to radically criticize every philosophy
which conceives the be coming as true. “Being neither leaves nor returns
to nothingness, is neither born nor dies; there is no time, no situation
in which Being is-not. If it should return to nothingness, it would not
be” (p. 45). And then,
That which is in time is not something that is possessed by the
eternal (precisely because it must be said of everything – and so
also of Being that appears in time – that it is eternally); so that the
not being of Being that is in time does not disprove that which,
moreover, cannot be in any way disproved: that Being in and
cannot not be (p. 83).
This is why he was regarded as a nihilist, the opposite being true,
because the nihilist is, according to Severino, the one who considers this
world, with its beginning and its end, a true reality which is bound to
cease to be.
There is however one more aspect that deserves attention. Severino
was a student of Gustavo Bontadini, the catholic philosopher (an
interesting debate between Bontadini and Severino, which, among other
things, shows the respect and affection they had for each other, is in
Bontadini and Severino (2017) who explained to him the speculative
aspects of the most observant Christian tradition, from which Severino
was eventually excommunicated (Cf. Severino, 2001a). It “contains the
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letters from the years 1961-1970 which tell how the Catholic Church
was led to officially declare the opposition between my thought and
Christianity” (p. 5).
The influence of a thinker in many respects connected to Gentile is
evident: with him, the philosophy of becoming reached its peak, and it
was Gentile to whom Severino returned many times in his works. 
As Bontadini (1954) wrote (that is now in Notes of philosophy, 1996),
“Gentile is the philosopher who brought modern era to an end and gave
birth to the contemporary age, and this shows the relevance of his work.
‘Gnoseologism’, i.e. the problem of knowledge as the problem of
prejudice, was the pivotal point of modern philosophy” (p. 23). And later
“what must be pointed out here is the relationship between classical and
Christian philosophy and his thought. This reveals, contrary to what is
often believed, a positive relationship of theoretical reconciliation rather
than irreconcilable opposition” (p. 25).
For this reason, our purpose is to identify the deeper meaning of an
intellectual debate which has been going on for decades.
2. The issue
Giovanni Gentile and Emanuele Severino face the problem of
knowledge–connection to the Absolute in two different times in the
history of philosophical tradition. The connecting thread between them
is, therefore, participation in the Truth, which, being absolute, is indeed
the only way for salvation – inasmuch absolute liberation – for the
thinking self acknowledging its transience. Deliverance from both the
wandering in the world and the fear of what will be afterwards.
Accordingly, at the beginning of the twentieth century Gentile
undermines the hegemony of the positivistic idea of truth as a mere
biologically determined fact which takes place in mere events. This is
achieved by the dialectic of becoming, which is the persistent realization
of the eternity of the transcendental Self. Yet ethical life can provide an
enduring meaning of life and salvation in history.
In the second half of the twentieth century Severino, also in the light
of the reflection on the actualism of some thinkers such as Gustavo
Bontadini and Ugo Spirito, after identifying in the actualism itself the
definitive outcome of the philosophy of becoming, or rather the
dissolution of the existing beings and of the existing things in the
becoming, reaffirmed, recovering ancient speculative echoes, the eternity
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of what is, being the existence just only the appearing of an eternal, of
what already is and can only be.
In fact, over the years the author of this paper has read the philosophy
of Gentile and Severino, but also those of Spinoza and Ugo Spirito, as
well as answers to a text by Seneca (Troades, 397-402 and 407- 408) that
has struck him since the early years of high school (a problem that has
caught him even earlier in his pre-adolescent disquietude).
Post mortem nihil est ipsaque mors nihil, / velocis spatii meta
novissima; / spem ponant avidi, solliciti metum: / tempus nos
avidum devorat et chaos. / Mors individua est, noxia corpori / nec
parcens animae [...] Quaeris quo iaces post obitum loco? / Quo
non nata iacent.
In truth, at least for the writer, to do philosophy is to answer this
statement. After, really nothing? Can we save ourselves, or will there be
another life instead?
In The world beyond, Ugo Spirito, in the view of Gentile’s reflection
on death, pointed out the inadequacy of phenomenal experience. Hence
he concluded:
Afterlife remains indeed transcendent due to an unsurpassed
dualism of heaven and earth, and we must resist the urge to try to
understand it by phenomenologizing the absolute in any way.
Nevertheless, despite its still radical alterity, afterlife is at the heart
of our lives, for it is the basic problem enclosing it all. And,
although the problem is not yet its solution, analysing its main
aspects is sufficient to raise hope in pursuit and to save us from
that spiritual idleness which leads to indulge facile dogmatisms of
faith or scepticism (Spirito, 1948, p. 189. Severino took into
account Spirito’s investigation, cf. Severino, 1950, pp. 51-54).
Later on, Spirito (1955) stated that the concept of “person” is often
associated with the human body, but this has revealed its ephemeral
nature bound to vanish with death. Thus, to surrender to death is to
surrender to “being nothing” (p. 109). This is the origin of the crisis of
the modern man.
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The crisis is thus caused by the inability of looking outside
ourselves. We are incapable of believing in an other as absolute, of
having faith in the idea. The crisis lies in the hypostasis of the
person, in egocentrism and egoism: becoming inward-looking,
loving only ourselves directly and being miserable due to the
awareness of our limitedness (pp. 129-130).
The result is a metaphysical opening without any individualistic
closure.
I am constantly given to myself in a stream of ideas which come to
my mind more or less unexpectedly, bringing me a light whose
nature I cannot forebode and of which I become aware at a later
stage. The origin of this stream of ideas transcends my person and
resolves itself in the reality of the whole. My thought is the
thought of reality inside me. The reality and I coincide in a single
centrality (Spirito, 1971, p. 190. For these aspects of Spirito’s
philosophy cf. Cavallera, 1988; 2000; 2010a; 2010b). 
Thus, Gentile’s most brilliant pupil has overcome in his own way
every individual finiteness, which is part of a whole where self alone can
find a meaning.
In this way, drawing on one of the main themes of actual idealism and
its school, between the nineteenth and the twentieth century, Severino
gives an extremely new and crucial meaning to the image of salvation,
which is enclosed in the eternal manifestation of all being. From this
perspective he stands apart from the traditional speculative views, which
are typically about what is not preserved (contingency). Yet – and this is
the argument of this article – the two salvation “messages” (Gentile’s and
Severino’s ones), although apparently different, complete each other (on
the connection between Gentile and Severino cf. De Giovanni, 2013).
The similarity lies in the fact that the both attempt to “rescue”, or, rather,
to “reveal” the eternal: it might seem paradoxical, but the connection is
closer than it may appear to be; better yet, Severino’s philosophy cannot
be understood without considering his remarks on Gentile’s philosophy.
It should be remembered that Severino states that according to
Gentile the true reality is not the one which is made, but the one which
is still to be done. His thought is therefore a radical support to the truth
of technology. “The inevitability of Gentile’s thought alone suffices to
establish the dominion of technology, i.e. to show that no limits nor
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obstacles stand in its way. Contrary to what is usually believed, there is a
deep connection between Gentile’s thought and technological
civilization. This is the reason why Gentile is not bygone time yet. He,
along with a few others – who need, by the way, to be understood – leads
to the twilight of western philosophy, which is the basis for every thought
and work of western tradition” (Severino, 2010, pp. 60-61). On the
celebration of the centenary of Gentile’s birth, Severino wrote that “every
‘ultimate’ truth which differs from the faith in the patency of becoming
and therefore from the faith in the identity between the whole and the
becoming, is an immutable which anticipates, thus making it impossible,
the becoming. […] To admit a solution for the problematic reality – such
are Spirito and Bontadini’s views – is to admit the possibility of an
ultimate truth (understood as a solution to the problem), namely of the
immutable that prevents the becoming and the problem whose
obviousness is believed. The belief in this faith requires recognizing in
Spirito’s “problematic dialecticism” (“situational problematicism” a step
backwards from Gentile’s “metaphysical dialectism” (“trascendental
problematicism”), where the problem is the content of the solution itself
(the becoming, the content of the immutable). Any chance to solve the
problem is thus discarded: the chance to reintroduce one of the
immutables excluded by the one immutable that is bound to reign in
western history: the obviousness of becoming and its consequent
awareness, the awareness of the whole as a problem” (Severino, 1977, p.
793).
3. The theme of holy in Giovanni Gentile
In addition to being the philosopher of actual idealism, Gentile’s works
were put in the Index Librorum Prohibitorum (cf. Verucci, 2006. On
religion in Gentile’s thought, cf. Spirito, 1969, pp. 95-123; Cavallera,
1994, pp. 41-166), because he and his students were the fiercest
opponents of neo-scholasticism. During the 1920s and 1930s, it aimed
to become, under the guidance of the Rev. Agostino Gemelli and his
school, not only the philosophy of Catholicism, but also, after the
Lateran Treaty (1929), of the whole Italian State. A wide collection of
writings concerning the debate between Gentile and neo-scholastic
philosophers was edited by H. A. Cavallera in Gentile (1994). During a
speech held in 1922 (My atheism and the history of Christianity), Gentile
said that “contemporary idealism yields neither to catholic barriers nor
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to abstract rationalism. Also, it is the first Italian philosophy to highly
praise religion in general, and especially Christianity and Catholicism as
a spiritual view of life: that same view which idealism aims to enliven” (p.
183). However, Gentile maintained he was catholic until his death, albeit
in his own way (cf. his lecture My religion, 1943). Also his family’s life
complied following catholic traditions (religious marriage and baptism).
Accordingly, actual idealism can be considered a realization of
Catholicism in philosophy, as can be seen from the lecture Il carattere
religioso dell’idealismo italiano [The religious character of Italian idealism]
(April 25, 1935) and from the definition of Religion (reprinted with the
title Che cos’è la religione [What is religion]) written in 1936 for the
Enciclopedia italiana [Italian Encyclopedia]. The two abovementioned
texts and the lecture My religion (which is Gentile’s only work unrevised
before its publication) can be read in Gentile, My religion and other
writings (1992). In My religion Gentile writes:
Man and God are undoubtedly distinct, yet not separate other
than as abstract terms of the living reality, which is the synthesis
between God made man and man raised to God by the Grace,
when God’s will is made their own (fiat voluntas tua!). Without
the unity behind this synthesis, there is no Christianity, no
absolute religion, which, in one word, is duality, but
notwithstanding a unity. The separation or rivalry which some
purport to preserve is worse than paganism. In fact, a heathen
would believe and have trust in a reconciliation between the
natural and the supernatural, between man and God. The man
discovering in himself God, and in this way somehow creates
God, is not the natural man but the spiritual man; he has entered
the realm of the spirit, where he is man and God at once. God is
therefore created by itself, not by man. And God became man in
Christ (p. 65). 
And in the same volume Cavallera states:
We are therefore witnessing, on the one hand, the realization of
religion in actual idealism (1935 speech), and, on the other, the
recognition, in the historical forms of religion, of the primacy of
Catholicism, because (see Religion) God is person and the soul is
immortal, even though true immortality is the one of spiritual
life, not that of the unrelated man, of the individual enclosed in
his limitedness. The reaffirmation of actual idealism does not
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exclude the connection to Catholicism in its institutional
properties. However, the turning point – the conflict between
institutional Catholicism and that one realized by actual idealism
– is always seen in the light of idealistic supremacy (p. 28).
Now, apart from the competition for the cultural leadership of Italy,
for our purposes, the theological debates concern the same root of those
endured by Spinoza: the question of the survival of the empirical self
(And still, Spinoza’s thought can be regarded as one of salvation by the
means of acquiescentia. Cf. Cavallera, 2014). Gentile, on the one hand,
states that the act in act is eternal, and on the other hand, he states the
ontic non-existence of the empirical self. This aspect, as for Severino’s
thought, is the focus of this article.
As Gentile (1916) wrote in the first edition of the General theory of the
spirit as a pure act, multiplicity as such, abstracted from the activity by
which it is established and valued, is not immortal; the One is immortal,
for it is the origin of multiplicity which itself cannot be multiplied.
Is the individual mortal or immortal? The Aristotelian individual,
as it is conceived by the public imagination, is indeed mortal: that
is to say, its immortality is its mortality, since its actuality is in the
immortal spirit. But it is mortal as a spiritual act, namely as the
individual individuating itself. Immortality’s domain is thus in
the act inasmuch pure act of the spirit outside which there is
nothing but abstraction. If man were not this act and did not feel
himself, albeit obscurely, in his immortal essence, he could not
live, because he would fall into an absolute practical scepticism
[…] The energy which sustains life is the awareness of the divine
and of the eternal whereby death and the vanishing of all
deciduous things is seen from high up the immortal life (Gentile,
1987, pp. 147-148).
Hence the denial of every mere naturalistic position (p. 226).
This viewpoint recurs in many of his works. In the second book of
System of logic (1th ed. 1922), Gentile focuses on the fear of death and
the unknown.
This same feeling of dread chills the heart of man, whether his
thought surpasses life so that he gazes astounded at his dull life
and hears the infinite silence which the universe will be for him
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once he has no ears to hear its sound, or he moves anxiously
backwards towards the infinite silence of nature not yet in motion
to create the life enjoyed by man. The same horror and loathing
caused by a corpse, which is the most evident annihilation of his
being alive (Gentile, 1987, Vols. 2, pp. 197-198).
Confronted with this horror, Gentile reaffirms the immortality of
autosynthesis, for it is irreducible to mere individual life.
In conclusion, death is frightening because it does not exist, nor
do nature, the past, and dreams. There is the dreaming man, but
the dreamed things do not exist. In the same way, death is the
denial of thought, but it cannot be actual what is realized through
the self-denial of thought. In fact, as we just saw, thought, being
infinite, can but be immortal (p. 200).
Gentile (1926) wrote about the eternity of the thinking thought also
in Warnings
The actual idealist reduces everything to the thought, though
such a thought is not the one of man, born of woman, doomed to
die, a mere individual member of society, to which he is more or
less quantité négligeable. […] This thought is then Thought itself,
the universal thought, unique and infinite: a divine thought
giving us strength to open our mouths […]. It must be noted that
this Thought, be it called spirit, subject, Self, or whatever it may
be called, is not something in itself and for itself, regardless of the
multiplicity of the world of the objects, where the thinking
activity manifests its creative strength” (Gentile, 1958, pp. 236-
237).
It would be worth reading Gentile’s meditations on death, where he
goes beyond the finiteness of the subject and gazes at the reality revealed
by the intelligere, by ascending to a higher plane (on the theme of death
cf. Cavallera, 2007, in which many unpublished works on the argument
(included) are analyzed).
The thirteenth chapter of Genesis and Structure of Society is of
unrivalled depth, especially considering it was written during critical
moments of Gentile’s life – his son Giovannino, a quite renowned
physician, had died on March 30, 1942, and death threats had become
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more frequent. Nevertheless, Gentile writes about transcendental society
and the immortality of the transcendental self: Gentile’s becoming
preserves everything, and through preservation it maintains everything.
Should this be the case, the empirical self which is dissolved is the
deciduous part of the self, not its real substance. The poem outlives the
poet, or maybe it does not outlive at all: it remains as potency of being
recovered in its founding elements.
What man actually wants, Gentile states, from an eudaimonistic
point of view, is not eternity, which has no connection with time, but
perpetuity, which is commensurate with time: a desire to live on
unlimitedly.
The individual will be there tomorrow as well. The day after too.
Always, since this reduced eternity, namely sempiternity, is to be
truly hoped. If life can continue after the dissolution of the body,
there is no reason not to think it cannot carry on unlimitedly.
Days, though, hours, every moment passes here, and it will pass
there too. Thus, time is not vanquished. And that other life, meant
as the continuation to this one, and not much different from it
(Gentile, 1946, p. 150).
In eternity, time flees, or rather, it is eternalized by the enfolding
thought.
A time no more enclosing the thought, nor the thinker nor its
whole historically determined being, before and after. It is rather
enclosed in a thought whose unfolding amazes the beholder, even
though the marvellous eternity of this world has arisen from him
and discloses the real world (p. 153).
On the distinction between eternity and perpetuity, Gentile identifies
three illusions to which most men succumb: first, believing that the soul,
intended as its substance, is immortal; but “separated from its activities,
it retreats to an abstract universality and loses every sign of its
individuality, therefore losing itself ” Ibid., p. 156.; second, believing that
the individual soul is immortal, “and we forget that the person is self-
consciousness and unification; it is no substance, as it is a process, an act
in which the synthesis of multiplicity occurs” (p. 156), resulting in an
antireligious, immoral and illogic illusion; lastly, believing in another
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world conceived as the one we experience, as if it were “a corner of this
one” (p. 159). Hence the conclusion which explains the true meaning of
immortality.
It is the immortality of the eternal process of the Self existing in
its actuation as universality, infinity and therefore immortality.
This recurrently causes the abnegation and sacrifice of the little self
to the big self, of the existing reality to the ideal which animates
reality and remarks that this immediate existence is not yet being.
[…] The immortality of the living man is such as the one of the
man living because he continuously dies to himself. By living this
way, he moves towards eternity, is rendered immortal (p. 170).
In this way, Gentile reaffirms the end of the empirical self and that the
idea of eternity is completely distinct from that of particularity. Actually,
this uninterrupted process is strictly speaking a preservation and a
trasumanar altogether. Multiplicity commits immortal life to eternity.
Immortal life does not belong completely to multiplicity, but rather to
eternity, to which it grants life inasmuch as eternal. It is the immortality
of the egregie cose, which are not only heroic enterprises or intellectual
works, but also that same love we feel for our beloved, for our children,
that love which makes us act selflessly and constructively; that which
grants the individual as such the possibility to escape from particularity
and to universalize itself in this life, a man among men. It is a very subtle
paragraph which can be easily misunderstood from a strictly religious
point of view. Resurrexit, non est hic. Gentile, despite his being officially
excluded by the Catholic Church due to his works, reaffirming its act in
act does not cancel the manifestation of the self, because eternity lies in
this manifestation of the world. In this universalization (on this aspect,
cf. Cavallera, 1991) process particularity proves universal maintaining
the point of view of multiplicity.
4. Earth and Joy in Emanuele Severino
Severino explores the fundamental thought developed in his La struttura
originaria in other crucial works, analysing deeply the meaning of
existence as being.
An essential work to understand the meaning of his speculation is
Destiny of necessity (1980). If we cannot escape destiny, truth is the
necessary saying. “Truth is the destiny of the Whole” (p. 124), and will
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is appearing: “it is the appearing of something which belongs to the world
dreamt by the alienation of truth. This world is the isolated earth, the
result visible inside the isolation of the earth” (p. 573). The existence of
the deciduous is therefore established in the context of the isolation of
the earth, but what is considered deciduous is nothing but the appearing
itself. Appearing is necessary, because it is the manifestation of destiny.
At the same time though it is contingent, for it is conceived in the
context of the isolation of the earth.
Finite appearing is the infinite appearing of the Whole (the
appearing of destiny is the appearing of destiny in its entirety),
and still the Whole does not appear in the circle of destiny’s
appearing. Its infinite appearing is enlightened in the unconscious
of this circle, which is surrounded by the shadows of the non-
appearing of the infinite enlightenment of the Whole. It is
therefore the circle (or the entwined circles) of the Whole’s finite
appearing. The Whole, overcoming all the contradictions of
reality, is Joy (p. 594).
Joy is outside the isolated earth, and, at the same time, it is the
overcoming of its loneliness, since it does not belong to the shadow of
appearing. “In Joy, the deciduous has always been past” (p. 597). It is the
awareness that inside the infinite appearing of the Whole, which encloses
finite appearing, lies the manifestation of the whole destiny, which can
but be Glory.
Destiny can but be the one of the whole, because it is the
incontrovertible manifestation of being. Since it is the
manifestation of the totality and eternity of being, it can but be
the revelation of the necessity of what is determined. Hence, the
circle of the appearing of destiny can only manifest its limitedness
(Severino, 2001, p. 27).
Later on, Severino explains that
the isolated earth is a segment of the infinite manifestation of the
earth. The isolated earths, gathered in every circle, are the
manifestation of the essence of totality; that is to say, the
disclosure of becoming, the progressive manifestation of that
eternal which is the isolation of the earth. […] Nor does the
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infinite appearing occur. Besides being the appearing of the
manifestation of the isolated earth, it is the infinite unfolding of
Glory of a constellation of circles (p. 551).
In this regard, Severino’s philosophy is one of salvation. This theme is
crucial in The Death and the Earth (2011). According to Severino, the
isolated earth is brought to completion by the death of empirical will,
because, after it, no more determinations of the isolated earth occur.
The eternal, which is the contrasted background of the isolated
earth, wanes and reaches completion; the eternal, now a
background without contrast, begins to appear. In this waning
and beginning to appear, the permanence of what is identical in
both configurations and in every other background configuration
appears (p. 413). 
Between death and the appearance of Joy, there cannot be any
intermediate being, for it would belong to the earth, but, after death, the
earth cannot occur anymore. Therefore
death is the extreme imminence of the union in every circle of
pure and isolated earths and of earth that saves. In the imminence,
that splendor of Joy is still, motionless, time does not flow because
nothing arrives (no eternal) (p. 414).
Accordingly, approaching death means approaching Joy (salvation in
truth), and the isolated earth wanes. In this way, the destination of being
this appears.
The destination is the appearing necessity of Glory (that is to say,
of the necessity for the saving earth to occur properly in every
circle of destiny), and therefore of the Glory of Joy, that is to say,
of the infinite ways in which the real Whole of beings endlessly
manifests itself (p. 425).
The self is the eternal appearing of destiny, whose splendour,
according to Severino, is simultaneously the splendour of its destination,
towards the Glory of Joy. It is indeed a great and bright manifestation of
immense power of salvific light.
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The endless isolated earths of the infinite constellation of the
finite circles of destiny are a part of the Whole, and it is necessary
that the totality of those earths be overcome through the advent
of the saving earth. Then, the infinite traces left bi the Whole in
this totality need to be deciphered so that the infinite reality of the
whole can appear in the infinite constellation of circles (p. 426).
The self, through death, manifests the incontrovertibility of being
inasmuch being, namely its eternity, and that Joy “is what every self of
the finite circles of destiny actually is” (p. 536). (For a punctual analysis
of Severino’s thought, see Goggi, 2015. See also Cusano, 2011; Spanio
(ed.), 2014. Cf. finally Severino & Scola, 2014). 
Existence, as Severino (2016) states in History, Joy is a continuous self-
deception, because the characteristic of the mortal as such is the will to
live “established on the belief that things are becoming per se” (p. 47).
However, present age – an age of technoscience following the age of
reason, preceded itself by the age of myth – is established on the certainty
of a future which can but reveal its deep contradictions, while
technoscience is curbed by the power of tradition, which intends to
evoke the ontological meaning of becoming something else. “Being
inferior to tradition, the age of technology is self-contradictory, because
technology cannot be what it aspires to be, that is, an infinite growth of
power” (p. 59). This, within the logic of western thought, is shown by
the limitedness of the empirical self (death).
It is inevitable that fear overshadows the paradise of technology
turning it into its opposite, whence it is evident that every
glimmer of happiness is to be lost. Extreme power knows it is
powerlessness. This is the contradiction of the age of technology
(p. 63).
The will to power is therefore the characteristic of the isolated earth,
as defined by Severino, of man’s life and, accordingly, of ethics, of which
it is an aspect “requiring us to overcome ourselves. In fact, once we reach
the good, we must continue living in it and thus overcome ourselves” (p.
81). For this reason, technology has proved to be the most rigorous form
of mistake. Technology, understood as a faith in a better future, carries
doubt with it. Faith recognizes it as an indissoluble presence.
Severino’s analysis of doubt is indeed incisive.
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Since doubt belongs to the isolated earth, it is itself a faith, whose
existence is possible just because, like every other faith, is founded
on the deepest doubt. Were the regressus in indefinitum
unavoidable, […] the fundament of the existence of faith would
be postponed indefinitely (p. 112).
The destiny of man is beyond the isolated earth. In fact, “faith, will,
pain, the normal contradiction in which we believe when we are in the
isolated earth, doubt, death, all wane along with the wane of the isolated
earth” (p. 125). Actually
the appearing of destiny is a characteristic of destiny, and, at once,
the essence of man. It is not what is called “man” within the
isolated earth, the mortal. Man is, in his essence, i. e. the circle of
destiny, the eternal manifestation of the Whole – of Joy […].
Every man is this manifestation, one of the true infinite lights […
]. However, in the essence of man, the Whole appears as the
infinite which does not reveal itself in all its aspects, it reveals itself
in itself. The essence of man is the finite manifestation of the
Whole (p. 140).
Therefore, the finite lies on the infinite road to Joy.
This implies the permanence of the Contradiction as it coexists
unfolded in circles. This means that, within the finite circle, pain still
exists.
This dark background persists endlessly, as much as Glory and the
Joy of Glory, to which the circles of pain are destined too, unfold.
It persists endlessly in the circles of Joy as well. Yet, it never appears
alone, for when it does, it is accompanied by the great wings of
salvation (p. 161).
By doing so, Severino confirms the inevitability of pain as intrinsic to
finiteness. Outside finiteness lies the sense of plenitude of the Whole.
Mortals want to ‘communicate’ and ‘understand each other’, but
they cannot get what they want as long as the conflict between
destiny and the isolated earth remains. What they think they are
obtaining while talking with the intention to communicate and
be understood is different from what they are saying and
meaning. Every conversation (agreement, disagreement, peace,
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war, love, hate) is inevitably ambiguous. As the conflict dissolves,
the intention of which language consists dissolves too: along with
verticality, ‘Good Friday’, the saving ‘Easter’ of the world, Joy,
appears, and the circles of destiny, which always overcame our
mortal being, have no need to communicate nor to be
understood, for they are completely clear to one another (p. 179).
With his very peculiar language, Severino grasps the presence of the
Contradiction – which preserves everything, since everything is clear to
one another – within the manifestation of the Whole, within the Joy of
Glory. The overcoming happens under an absolute light, preserving it all
without any will. One could say that, according to Severino, the
foundation of the human, and, as such, of pain and joy, of the
contingency aspiring to immutability, lies within will. Walking away
from will means entering the saving earth.
In this case, the finite manifestation of the infinite is, according to
Severino, the preservation of multiplicity within eternity: beings are
eternal.
5. Salvation in truth
Thus, with an extremely refined dialectic, the saving image of the great
philosophical discourse returns.
The speculative discourse is, above all, an answer to the question:
what will become of us afterwards? Or, to better say, what will happen
afterwards? What is the afterwards? Man knows more than any other
thing that he must die, as he has seen the others around him die; yet, of
course, he does not want to die. Many religions provide a hope of
salvation. Christianity in particular assures the resurrection of the body.
However, many questions have been raised throughout history: which
body will be resurrected? A young body or an old one? Will once living
people be able to meet again somewhere after their death? Many answers
have been given for these questions (on the concept of Heaven, see
Bernheim & Stravides, 1994). It appears to be clear that the first idea to
come to our mind is that of the other world as a continuation to this one,
as a way to preserve our affections. This, however, is a human
simplification which does not consider the process of indiamento (Cf.
Dante, Paradiso, IV, 28) guaranteed by Christian religion. The
philosopher cannot accept the idea of a sui generis reproduction of this
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world, knowing that the empirical self as such cannot understand what
is by nature the denial of the empirical.
In this way, within the same Christian tradition, albeit following two
different paths, Gentile and Severino return to the theme of appearing,
which is to say of existence. Both sense the fragility of every immortality
appearing in time and space. Nevertheless, both succeed in saving
multiplicity through its negation: Gentile does so by the means of the
universalization process (Dante’s trasumanar. “Trasumanar significar per
verba / non si porìa”, Paradiso, I, 70-71), Severino through the advent of
the “saving earth”, which is the denial of will and therefore of mere
particularity. Philosophy, when it is not reduced to philosophical
philology, can still get to the core of things, and for this we owe it a debt.
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